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No topic has attracted more attention from legal and political
philosophers in recent years than justice-much of it stimulated by
the work of John Rawls" and much of it derivative from his work.
A great virtue of David Miller's Social Justice2 is that it is not another
commentary on Rawls. Without ignoring Rawls, his followers, or his
critics, Miller approaches the problem of justice from a fresh perspec-
tive and makes a genuinely original contribution to the contemporary
discussion of the subject.
For those who have been feeling somewhat intellectually irrespon.
sible for declining to declare their allegiance to some particular theory
of justice, Miller's book should be reassuring. In Miller's view, no
single theory can account for the complexity and diversity of the
concept of justice. He argues that anyone who seeks to develop such
a theory is bound to fail because the elements of the concept of justice
are mutually irreconcilable. One might expect a thesis of this sort
to yield only a negative critique of other theories, but Miller offers
much more. His analysis produces what may be cailed micro-theories
of the various elements of the concept and a general theory of the
relation between conceptions of justice and the kinds of societies in
which they are likely to appear. Ultimately, Miller's project is not
completely satisfying because he resolutely resists the possibility of a
single prescriptive theory of justice that would decide among com-
peting conceptions of justice. Yet his perceptive analyses of these
various conceptions and their social contexts stand as a prolegomenon
to any future work toward such a theory.
Miller's subject is social justice, the "distribution of benefits and
burdens throughout a society, as it results from the major social in-
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stitutions."3 It concerns such matters as the regulation of wages and
profits, the protection of individual rights, and the allocation of hous-
ing, medicine, and welfare benefits. But it does not deal with the
benefits and burdens distributed by the legal and political system.
Miller thinks that social justice differs in important ways from legal
justice (which, as Miller defines it, concerns "the punishment of wrong-
doing and the compensation of injury" 4). His insistence on this dis-
tinction yields some of the many insights in the book (for example,
the argument that a person's voluntary action is not a necessary con-
dition for allocating benefits and burdens to him in social justice,
though it may be in legal justice).5
Miller distinguishes three conceptions of social justice: to each ac-
cording to his rights, to each according to his deserts, and to each
according to his needs. 6 Rights may conflict with deserts and with
needs because individuals may hold rights that they do not deserve
or do not need. This conflict is merely contingent, Miller maintains,
for we can strive for an ideal society in which individuals have a right
only to what they deserve, or only to what they need. Deserts and
needs, however, stand in more uncompromising opposition. "[W]hen
we speak of a man deserving something we have in mind some fa-
vourable attribute which we think ought to bring him a benefit,
whereas when we speak of [his] needing something we are thinking
of a lack or deficiency on his part. . . ." Similarly, the most deserving
individual (for example, the hardest working person) is not likely to
be the individual with the greatest need. Miller claims that deserts
and needs are "necessarily" in conflict.8 But despite what Miller says,
that conflict actually seems to be merely contingent: the requirements
of the two conceptions could coincide (as when the hardest worker
was also the neediest person), though such a coincidence is so unlikely
that it might be considered accidental.
Like Miller's concept of social justice, Social Justice is divided into
three parts. The value of the first part of the book, fortunately, does
not lie in its conclusions, which rather blandly state that each of the
three conceptions of justice is "distinct," and that each is "hard to de-
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greater worth are the many, often self-contained, analyses of aspects
of justice. In its good sense and clarity of thought, and in its appre-
ciation of the richness and subtleties of the idea of justice, Miller's
work will remind some readers of that of Henry Sidgwick, the ablest
exponent of the doctrine (utilitarianism) that Miller is most often
disposed to attack. Moreover, just as Sidgwick's efforts continue to
enlighten even those who reject his utilitarianism, so Miller's con-
tribution will repay study even by those who would oppugn his skep-
tical attitude toward general theories of justice.
Miller's analytical technique bears most fruit in the chapters in Part
I on "Deserts" and "Needs." Miller finds, for example, that our or-
dinary beliefs about economic desert comprise a "confused tangle," 10
but he succeeds better than any writer on justice in making some
sense out of them. In slightly more than a dozen pages of acute
analysis, he shows that there are two main criteria of economic re-
ward-contribution and effort-and that neither can be given an ade-
quate justification."' The trouble with contribution, according to
Miller, is that extraneous factors-such as the fertility of land and
the quality of tools-affect an individual's contribution as much as
the personal qualities for which he deserves reward. Furthermore, we
cannot measure individual contributions in most cooperative activi-
ties; the idea of assigning a specific (marginal or other) value to an
individual contribution in such contexts simply does not have any
moral meaning. Ultimately, Miller himself adopts a version of the
contribution criterion of economic desert, 12 but he never really pro-
vides a satisfactory answer to his own criticisms.
Effort fares no better as a criterion. Any useful work requires,
Miller argues, a combination of effort, innate ability, and acquired
ability. We can almost never say how much of the product should
be attributed to the voluntary actions of a person whose effort, on
this criterion, we should wish to reward. Anyhow, as Miller shows in
a penetrating discussion of the relation of determinism and desert,
voluntary action is not always a necessary condition for praising or
rewarding someone. We do not look beyond personal qualities, which
are to a large extent involuntary, when we say, for example, that
"the prettiest girl deserves to win the beauty contest, the most skilful
shot deserves to win at marbles, the ablest candidate deserves the
10. P. 114.
11. Pp. 102-14.
12. "The basis of desert will be the value which each individual has contributed to
the common stock of society, or more strictly that portion of the value which is due to
his own efforts, skills, and abilities." Pp. 118-19.
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scholarship."' 3 Despite Miller's efforts to suggest a positive criterion
of economic desert, however, we leave this section, as we leave most
of the sections in the first part of the book, with a sense of the fu-
tility of seeking general criteria for even limited aspects of justice,
such as economic desert.
At first glance, Miller's analysis of needs seems to point the way
toward a more determinate criterion of justice. His account is in-
tended to make the question of what a person's needs are almost
wholly empirical: to say that "A needs X" is to say that "A will suffer
harm if he lacks X.' u 4 "Harm" is to be understood as whatever in-
terferes with activities essential to a person's plan of life. Such a
nonrelativist approach, establishing a standard that is partly inde-
pendent of people's perceptions of their needs, has real advantages.
It provides an answer to critics of the idea of need who claim that
needs are so indefinitely expansive that a society could hardly begin
to satisfy them, and therefore presumably should not try.15 It also
escapes the implication, accepted by some of the same critics, that
if customary standards of living are low, so are needs.1 6 Miller's ap-
proach, moreover, allows us to take a critical stance toward an indi-
vidual's claims of need, without actually imposing upon him our
own view of a way of life. We do not have to approve of someone's
plan of life to be able to point out that he needs, or does not need,
certain things to fulfill it, whether or not he wants them or knows
he needs them.
Yet (as Miller evidently recognizes) we have to find a person's life
plan intelligible at least in the sense that -we can understand how
the plan has significance and value for someone. We would not want
to endorse a pyromaniac's need for plenty of matches and easy access
to buildings. He actually needs psychiatric help, not as part of his life
plan but as a part of a plan that we think would be acceptable. Pre-
sumably, part of the reason that life plans like the pyromaniac's can-
not be said to have value or significance is that such plans, pursued
successfully, harm other people and interfere with the fulfillment of
their life plans. If so, then we can criticize a much wider range of
life plans and the needs they generate than Miller suggests. The small
13. Pp. 96-97.
14. P. 130.
15. E.g., S. BENN & R. PETERS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES AND TiE DEMOCRATIC STATE 141-48
(1959); M. HALBWACHS, L'ItVOLUTION DES BESOINS DANS LES CLASSES OUVRIERES (1933).
16. "'Basic needs' are thus a function of the general living standards of the community
in question .... Where poor sight is common and spectacles rare, there would be no
basic need for spectacles." S. BENN & R. PETERS, supra note 15, at 145-46.
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crack that Miller opens for evaluation in his concept of need expands
under the slightest critical pressure, and the concept of need as a
basis of justice, despite Miller's meritorious efforts, begins to look
problematic again.
The second part of the book illustrates how single-minded defend-
ers of each conception of justice-rights, desert, and need-try to
justify that conception and resolve the difficulties of implementing
it. The justifications and the answers to the difficulties of implemen-
tation, Miller claims, come from a theorist's adopting a view of society
that supports his conception at the expense of its rivals. In this way,
Miller shows that arguments about social justice cannot be arguments
merely about justice, but must also involve disputes about different
views of human nature and society. Miller examines three theorists:
Hume, who advocates the conception of rights within a "stable or-
der"; Spencer, who defends the conception of desert within a "com-
petitive market" society; and Kropotkin, who supports the conception
of need within a "solidaristic community." One may wonder why
Miller chose these particular theorists. All three of them are, or have
often been regarded as, utilitarians of one sort or another, and Miller
must in each case justify his interpretation of their theories before
he can use the theorist for the purposes of his own argument. Miller,
furthermore, does not succeed in showing that an idea of justice must
necessarily, or even usually, correspond to a particular view of society.
For example, it is not prima facie plausible to suppose that a purely
rights-based conception of justice can be justified only in the context
of an aristocratic society such as that depicted by Hume, though it
may be in some sense appropriate for that society. Miller does not
even attempt to show that other kinds of societies cannot theoretically
accommodate justice as rights. He would have to establish that propo-
sition for rights and for each of the other conceptions of justice if
he were to make good on the general claim of Part II. Neverthe-
less, Miller has achieved a great deal here by showing, what so many
theorists of justice neglect, that arguments about conceptions of justice
turn in part on general views of society and human nature.
The third part of the book forges a somewhat firmer link between
conceptions of justice and views of society-this time empirically in-
stead of philosophically. Offering the rudiments of a "sociology of
justice," Miller attempts to show that particular social structures gen-
erate certain conceptions of social justice and that it is "rational or
appropriate" for individuals living within a particular structure to
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adopt the corresponding conception of justice. 17 He considers three
basic types of societies: primitive, hierarchical or feudal, and market.
At this point, however, the tidy trinitarian structure of the book
begins to break down. Justice as deserts characterizes market society,
while justice as rights predominates in hierarchical or feudal society.
But Miller's primitive society has no conception of social justice; the
network of close personal relationships in this kind of society pro-
duces commitment to values such as generosity rather than justice.
Justice as needs corresponds uniquely to none of the societies; it ap-
pears as a subsidiary principle in market societies in which market
relations have become less salient and in egalitarian communities that
spring up within the other types of societies in response to "social
dislocation."'
But these further complexities serve a purpose. Miller is ultimately
interested in explaining the conception of justice current in the kind
of society we live in, and although that society ("organized capitalism")
is a variant of market society, it shares features with each of the other
types of societies. It therefore can hardly be expected to fit comfortably
into Miller's tripartite schema. In organized capitalism, membership
in a corporate group begins to replace the individualism of the market;
exchange relationships among individuals give way to status relation-
ships among members of organizations. Consequently, the basis of
desert, which prevailed as the criterion of justice in a pure market
society, changes. Since each person's contribution to the corporate
product cannot be measured, desert is apportioned on the basis of
the positions that individuals hold in an organization, the positions
being graded according to their social contribution and being filled
according to competitive merit. Miller believes that, with this so-
ciological approach, he can also explain certain tensions or mixtures
in our conception of social justice-for example, between desert and
need as criteria for the allocation of benefits. Pure market societies
have no room for justice as needs, but organized capitalism justifies
rewarding persons of higher organizational status by pointing to their
(alleged) greater contribution to social well-being, which finally must
be interpreted as the satisfaction of individual needs. The welfare
state seeks to satisfy basic needs and then allocates the remaining
benefits in accord with merit or desert.
These happy reconciliations of deserts and needs, as Miller appre-
ciates, have not been achieved in modern societies. In the first place,
17. P. 255 (emphasis in original).
18. Pp. 330-31.
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the "claims that business has become a profession, and that it acknowl-
edges its social responsibilities, conflict with the hard fact that a busi-
nessman's actions are still constrained by the need to make a suffi-
ficiently large profit."19 The demands of the market and of justice as
deserts (determined by the market) still predominate in organized capi-
talism. In the second place, the conflict between desert and need
runs deeper than the merely empirical constraints of modem society.
The conflict is a moral one. The idea of rewarding desert, Miller
points out, presupposes human inequality; differences in reward cor-
respond to inequalities in status within organizations, which in turn
refer to differences in skill and talent. The idea of distribution ac-
cording to need, in contrast, presupposes a sense of human equality,
in which justice does not take account of differences in status, skills,
or talents. Miller speculates that modern societies will continue to
embody both of these ideas, sometimes emphasizing one and some-
times the other.
The complexity of justice finally defeats Miller. As a sociologist
of justice, he can explain how these conflicts in our conception of
justice arise, how they vary in different societies, and under what
conditions one element of justice may come to dominate another.
But he refuses to pursue a theory of justice that would order and
resolve the complexities that he has so perceptively revealed and ex-
plained. Indeed, his account points to "the relativist conclusion that
no single conception of justice can be preferred to any other, and that
consequently no definite prescriptions about the justice or injustice
of a policy can be made."20
Must we accept this conclusion? The leading theories of justice
that today resist it-utilitarianism and the contractarianism of Rawls
-come under attack from Miller for deviating "sharply from intuitive
judgments of justice which we feel no inclination to give up."21 Utili-
tarianism, committed to aggregating benefits and burdens, cannot take
account of how those benefits and burdens are to be distributed. Utili-
tarianism can show that justice is generally beneficial to society, Miller
asserts, but it cannot explain why in particular instances the distrib-
utive claims of justice should have any weight independent of their
utility. Somewhat surprisingly, Miller argues that Rawls's theory is vul-
nerable to the same charge: because it demands the maximization of
benefits for one particular group in society (the worst-off), the theory
19. Pp. 312-13.
20. P. 342.
21. P. 31. Miller's attack comes at pp. 31-51.
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turns out to be a modified form of utilitarianism. One may doubt
whether an interpretation of Rawls's theory that pays so little attention
to his first principle of justice (equal liberty) and the priority he
assigns it can be an adequate foundation for a critique of con-
tractarianism.
Even putting that doubt aside, we should still wonder why our
"intuitive judgments" and "ordinary thinking" should be decisive in
justifying and choosing a theory of justice. While arguing that ordi-
nary language and ordinary thinking are the proper place to begin
an analysis of justice, Miller himself does "not hesitate to impose a
more precise use of terms if important distinctions are in danger of
being lost."'2 2 Furthermore, a "fundamental assumption" of his socio-
logical inquiry is that a "man's sense of justice is strongly affected
by the nature of the relationships which he enjoys with other men."23
If the social structure shapes conceptions of justice, surely we can
sometimes criticize a particular social order for producing conceptions
of justice that we find unacceptable, and recommend that social struc-
tures be transformed so that more satisfactory conceptions of justice-
even a theory of justice-can be realized. The conflict between desert
and need may be inevitable in our ordinary thinking about justice
sometimes criticize a particular social order for producing conceptions
in the organized capitalistic society in which we live, but that is no
reason, or at least not a sufficient reason, for rejecting any theory of
justice that seeks to resolve such conflicts. It may be a reason for
conceding that a theory of justice will have to call for significant
changes in the structure of society, perhaps more radical changes than
proponents of such theories have appreciated. It may also be a reason
for demanding that such theories supply a foundation that in part
stands independently of appeals to ordinary thinking or other socially
determined intuitions. But unless some independent standpoint is
possible, we shall inevitably remain prisoners of the complexities of
prevailing conceptions of justice.
Few philosophers have portrayed as well as Miller the richness of
these complexities and the extent to which they lie deeply embedded
in the structures of social life. But Miller does not establish that it
is futile to seek a theory that would transcend these complexities and
the social structures that generate them. The paralyzing effects of the
relativism implied by Miller's approach should, on the contrary, un-
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